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Abstract 
A current English education policy is to encourage all state primary schools 
to become academies: state-funded, non-selective, and highly autonomous 
establishments. Primary schools have been able to opt-in to academy status 
since 2010 and academies now account for twenty-one per-cent of the 
primary sector. This paper investigates the causal effect of voluntary academy 
conversion on primary school assessment outcomes, and on entry-year intake 
composition. Unlike existing evidence focused on earlier academies formed 
from failing secondary schools, no evidence is found of an academy 
conversion effect on attainment for the average pupil, although pupils with 
special educational needs do perform better in reading tests after academy 
conversion. There is no evidence that academy conversion affects the 
composition of the entry-year intake. 
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The relentless growth in the number of academies represents arguably the greatest 
transformation of the English state school sector since the introduction of comprehensive 
schools in the mid-1960s. First introduced in the early 2000s, academies are state-funded, 
non-selective, yet highly autonomous schools operating largely without local authority 
interference. Since the change in UK government in 2010, the Department for Education 
(DfE) has overseen a process of “mass academisation” whereby all state schools have been 
encouraged to become academies. 65 per-cent of secondary and twenty-one per-cent of 
primary schools are now academies. 
A number of studies suggest the high priority attached to the mass academisation programme 
is justified. The conversion of existing secondary schools between 1988 and 1997 into 
foundation schools, which enjoyed greater autonomy than their predecessors, was estimated 
to increase the proportion of pupils passing five GCSEs or more by five percentage points on 
average (Clark 2009). Between 2002 and 2010, around 200 secondary sponsored academies 
were established. These academies replaced underperforming schools following targeted 
government intervention. Research suggests that the replacement of these schools with 
academies led to an improvement in pupils’ GCSE attainment (Eyles, Hupkau, et al. 2016a). 
Pupils attending these academies were also more likely to complete a degree following their 
schooling (Eyles, Hupkau, et al. 2016b). 
The existing body of research into academies focuses overwhelmingly on secondary 
sponsored academies established before 2010. Sponsored academies are far less prevalent 
than converter academies, which are formed by schools that voluntarily elect to become 
academies. These schools tend to be already well-performing, and educate advantaged pupils. 
Researchers have only recently turned their attention towards converter academies. For 
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example, Worth (2015) and Eyles, Machin, et al. (2016) both show that attainment in primary 
converter academies does not improve following academy conversion.  
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, this paper exploits the availability of data before 
and after conversions to identify the effect of voluntary academy conversion on pupil 
attainment in primary schools. Since parents may interpret a school’s decision to become an 
academy as a signal of school quality, this paper also considers whether voluntary academy 
conversion alters the composition of primary schools’ entry-year intake. 
Whilst this paper shares much in common with the contemporaneously but independently 
produced analysis of Eyles, Machin, et al. (2016), the research design differs importantly. 
This paper uses a different and considerably larger treatment group; and investigates 
heterogeneous treatment effects at the pupil level. The literature review will argue that the 
control and treatment groups in their paper are more likely to differ in unobserved time-
variant dimensions than the groups defined in this paper. 
This paper finds no evidence that the average pupil performs any better in end-of-primary-
school reading and maths tests as a result of their school becoming a converter academy. 
Similarly, no evidence is found that average pupil attainment mid primary school is affected 
by academy status. However, evidence is uncovered that one sub-group of pupils, those with 
special educational needs, perform modestly better in reading tests. Lastly, the composition 
of the entry-year intake does not appear to change with respect to several pupil characteristics 
following conversion. 
This paper informs a lively public debate over the merits of academies, which are opposed by 
most teacher unions, some local authorities and major opposition political parties. The debate 
was galvanised by the 2016 government white paper Education Excellence Everywhere 
which declares the DfE’s aspiration for every English state school to become an academy (or 
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be in the process of doing so) by 2020 (Department for Education 2016).
2
 The scale of the 
reform is unprecedented, if this ambition is realised then state-funded schools will be largely 
independent of local government and the English state school system will secure its position 
as the world’s most decentralised. 
Academies are relatively less prevalent in the primary sector than the secondary sector, and 
since the government has already ensured that many of the worst performing primary schools 
have become sponsored academies, the biggest consequence of full academisation will be an 
explosion in the number of primary converter academies: the specific academy type studied 
in this paper.   
The conversion process is known to place significant administrative and financial burdens on 
the DfE, local authorities and schools themselves. For example, the DfE incurred additional 
costs of £1bn due to the academies programme between April 2010 and April 2012 (National 
Audit Office 2012). This includes one off costs such as the £25,000 grant paid to schools to 
facilitate the conversion process, as well as the recurrent additional cost per open academy. In 
2012/13, this was estimated as £260,000 per annum on average. At a time when the state 
school sector is facing resource pressures, such as teacher shortages, and expecting other 
radical reforms, such as the introduction of a national school funding formula, this timely 
analysis is unable to provide evidence of any benefit to primary school pupils from academy 
conversion. 
2 Institutional background 
There are two broad types of state school in England: maintained schools and academies. 
Maintained schools receive funding and some professional and pupil-facing services from 
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 The whitepaper stated that schools would be forced to become academies by 2022 even if this was against 
schools’ wishes. A hostile backlash led to a policy revision whereby state schools would be encouraged but not 
compelled to become academies by 2022. 
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local education authorities (LEAs), to whom the government has historically delegated the 
provision of state schools. These authorities also set, or constrain, the policies and processes 
of their maintained schools; although the degree of control LEAs have over schools varies 
between different types of maintained school. The types of maintained school are, from least 
to most autonomous: community, voluntary-controlled, voluntary-aided and foundation 
schools. Academies, on the other hand, are funded directly by the DfE and are largely 
independent of LEAs. 
Academies recruit and contract their own staff, unlike community and voluntary-controlled 
schools whose staff is employed by their LEAs. Academies may impose their own 
employment terms and can disregard nationally negotiated teacher pay and conditions. They 
also have considerable freedom in devising their own curriculum which must be “broad and 
balanced” and include English, maths, science and religious studies (Department for 
Education 2010). However, they do not have to follow the national curriculum in these 
subjects unlike maintained schools who are bound to the full national curriculum. Academies 
set their own admission policy unlike community and voluntary-controlled schools which are 
subject to an LEA admission policy.
3
  
Maintained schools are run by a board of between 9 and 20 governors. In community schools, 
one-fifth of the governors are appointed by the LEA. In foundation, voluntary-aided and 
voluntary-controlled schools, a separate charitable (often faith-based) foundation appoints 
between one-quarter and a majority of the governors, reducing the LEA’s control. Academies 
are governed by private charitable trusts that are independent of the LEA. These trusts set 
their own budget and policies, including the length of the school day and year. Academies are 
in effect the UK equivalent of charter schools in the USA. 
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Officially, academies should not be funded advantageously when compared to maintained 
schools. However, a 2012 National Audit Office survey of converter academy head teachers 
suggested that 77 per-cent of academies converted in order to obtain more funding for front-
line education (National Audit Office 2012). Academies and maintained schools receive 
comparable Dedicated Schools Grant (DSG) funding which covers mainstream education 
provision and is the main source of funding for schools. However, there has been a historical 
disparity between academies and maintained schools in respect of funding for auxiliary 
functions. LEAs centrally provide some services to maintained schools that academies need 
to procure independently. Academies formerly received an additional grant in order to 
provide these functions.
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  It boosted some academies’ budgets in excess of 10 per-cent and 
was widely considered to overcompensate academies. This grant has now been replaced with 
the Educational Services Grant (ESG), paid on a common per-pupil rate. Since the 2015/16 
school-year academies and maintained schools are financed on a comparable basis 
(Department for Education 2014). 
An understanding of the academy sector’s expansion is important as academies can be 
grouped into two very different subcategories. By 2000 it was apparent to the then Labour 
government that there was a pervasive problem of under-performance, poor behaviour and 
low aspirations in inner-city secondary schools. The government’s solution was to inject 
innovative management and private sector best practices into these failing schools. The 
government set about matching selected schools to sponsors – an individual, business or 
charitable organisation – who would influence the management, ethos, and curriculum of the 
school as it re-opened as an academy. These original academies would often occupy new or 
extensively refurbished facilities co-financed by the sponsor.
5
 Between 2002 and 2010, 203 
such academies were established; all of which were secondary schools and most were former 
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 Academies founded as a result of the DfE imposing academy status on 
failing schools are now referred to as sponsored academies. 
The composition of the academy school sector changed dramatically following the formation 
of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010. The new Secretary 
of State for Education was keen to extend the opportunity to enjoy academy freedoms to 
schools that were not failing or located within inner-city or deprived neighbourhoods. In July, 
the Academies Act 2010 became one of the fastest pieces of education legislation to be 
adopted by parliament. It gave all schools the option to voluntarily become academies from 
the 2010/11 school-year, ultimately leading to the first primary academies. Academies 
formed from schools which voluntarily chose to become academies are known as converter 
academies. 
Schools rated “outstanding” by OFSTED originally had their applications pre-approved 
meaning they could become academies from September 2010. From April 2011, all 
applications from “well preforming” schools received priority from the DfE.7 The application 
process is relatively swift, with eight months elapsing on average between an initial 
expression of interest and the actual re-opening of a school as an academy. The approval rate 
for primary converter academies applications is 90 per-cent, which should allay any fears that 
schools are “cherry picked” to become academies.8 It is not uncommon for conversions to 
take place mid school-year, although many conversions occur over the summer school break.  
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 Some academies were new establishments with no predecessor school, some were previously private schools. 
7
 According to National Audit Office (2012), “well performing” is based on the last three years’ exam results; 
prior OFSTED inspections, particularly OFSTED judgements on leadership and the capacity to improve; 
financial management, and any other evidence deemed significant. 
8
 Statistic is calculated from the author’s own analysis of the DfE’s Open Academies and Applications Dec ’15 
dataset, and refers to the number of all applications received by the end of December 2015 to be approved. 
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The DfE continues to identify under-performing schools, match them with sponsors and 
impose academy status. Weak schools that apply to become converter academies can have 
their application withdrawn and face a sponsor-led academy takeover thrust upon them. 
Table 1 shows the number of each state primary school type open at the start of every school-
year since 2005. Five years after their introduction, converter academies account for 11.1 per-
cent of the primary school sector. 5.4 per-cent of primary schools are now sponsored 
academies. Table 2 depicts the number of primary conversions during each school-year by 
predecessor school type. Around 100 primary schools converted during the 2010/11 school-
year. Since then between 350 and 450 conversions have taken place each school-year. Rough 
calculations suggest that if the government is to meet its stated ambition of full academisation 
by the start of the 2022 school-year, then the rate of conversions must quadruple. Although a 
slightly disproportionate number of early converters were community schools, it appears that 
the overall predecessor school type distribution corresponds to the prevalence of each type in 
the pre-academy period. 
In England pupils start primary school at the age of four or five and complete seven school-
years at primary level before joining a secondary school at age ten or eleven. Primary school 
is split into three stages: reception which lasts a single school-year; key stage 1 (KS1) which 
covers the second and third years of primary school (known as year 1 and 2), and key stage 2 
(KS2) which encompasses the final four years of primary schooling. 
At the end of both key stages, schools assess the attainment of their pupils in English, maths 
and science. Schools have good reasons to encourage their pupils to perform well in the KS2 
tests. KS2 assessment performance is an integral component of school league tables and the 
wider school accountability system. KS2 performance can also affect pupils’ secondary 
school experience if their secondary school tracks students by ability, since KS2 performance 
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is often used by secondary schools to gauge the ability of pupils joining from primary 
schools. 
3 Literature review 
3.1 US evidence: charter schools 
Other nations have introduced new, more autonomous school types in an attempt to improve 
attainment. There is a well-established literature on charter schools, which were introduced to 
the US in 1992. Like academies, charter schools are highly autonomous, fee-free and non-
selective. Unlike academies, charter schools tend to be new establishments with no 
predecessor state school. 
The causal effect of charter school attendance is often identified using charter admission 
lotteries to instrument the number of years spent in a charter school.  Identification depends 
on the lotteries being fair and, by implication, lottery winners and losers not being 
systematically different. Angrist et al. (2010) find that lottery winners test scores are 0.35σ 
and 0.12σ higher per year of charter attendance in maths and English language arts (ELA) 
tests respectively. σ denotes the standard deviation of the test score distribution for a given 
subject, grade and year. Based on different samples, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011) and Dobbie 
and Fryer Jr (2011) report quantitatively similar effects for maths test scores, but find ELA 
test score effects in limited circumstances only. 
There are good reasons to interpret these results cautiously. Admission lotteries are held 
when schools are oversubscribed which is a consequence of good performance. Therefore, 
the studies pre-condition on school quality. These studies also condition on schools retaining 
lottery records which might be associated with the efficiency or competence of the school 
(Dobbie and Fryer Jr 2011). The interaction of these factors means that the samples of the 
aforementioned studies are small. The sample of eight schools in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 
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(2011) is the largest of the three. Hoxby and Murarka (2009) use a larger sample of 42 charter 
schools located across New York City. They report a much smaller per year of charter school 
attendance effect of 0.09σ on maths test scores, and a statistically insignificant reading test 
score effect. 
Other lottery based (Gleason et al. 2010) and observational (matching) evidence (CREDO 
2013) suggests some charter schools are ineffective. Urban charter schools seem to be 
effective whereas non-urban charters appear to be ineffective or harmful. Angrist et al. (2013) 
argues that student demographic differences explain a small portion of the urban/non-urban 
distinction, whereas variation in the policies and practices of urban and non-urban charter 
schools have greater explanatory power. The No Excuses philosophy, incorporating strict 
discipline, academic rigour and high expectations, may be driving the urban charter school 
effect (Angrist et al. 2013). 45 per-cent of the variation in charter school effectiveness is 
associated with policies aligned to the No Excuses model (Dobbie and Fryer Jr 2013). 
Evidence on the medium term effect of charter school attendance is similarly mixed. Teen 
pregnancy and incarceration are less likely amongst charter attendees (Dobbie and Fryer Jr 
2014). Yet charter attendance does not appear to affect the likelihood of high school 
graduation or college enrollment (Angrist et al. 2016). 
State to charter school conversions, which are more comparable to England’s experience with 
academy schools, have also been studied. Abdulkadiroǧlu et al. (2016) focuses on nine 
charter takeovers of failing New Orleans, LA public schools, and another in Boston, MA. To 
accommodate selection into and out of takeover schools, the authors use enrolment in the 
schools pre-takeover to instrument enrolment post-takeover. Takeovers are shown to have 
significant positive effects on maths and reading test scores. A similar study by Fryer Jr 
(2014) imposes the freedom and practices associated with effective charter schools on eight 
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randomly selected failing elementary schools in Houston, TX. After two years of exposure, 
maths test scores in the treated schools improve by 0.15σ on average relative to their closest 
matched school from the control group. 
3.2 English literature: grant maintained and academy schools 
The academies programme is not the first initiative to increase the autonomy of England’s 
schools. Between 1988 and 1997, if maintained schools won a majority vote of current 
parents they could partially opt out of LEA control by becoming a grant maintained (GM) 
school.
9
 One-third of secondary schools held such a vote. Clark (2009) uses a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design to estimate the GM conversion effect. GM conversion meant 
greater autonomy, including control over staffing and admission policies, and more generous 
capital and current expenditure funding (according to estimates). Clark reports that the 
percentage of pupils in converters passing five GCSEs or more increased by 4 to 6 percentage 
points (from a base of 60 per-cent). The prior attainment of the entry year intake increased for 
converters, and they experienced greater teacher turnover and a net rise in teacher numbers. 
No evidence is found that schools neighbouring a GM converter were affected by their 
neighbour’s conversion. 
The majority of research into academies is based on the first generation of sponsored 
academies. An early, government commissioned, evaluation of the academies programme 
reported that improvements in the GCSE attainment of the first 27 academies exceeded the 
national average improvement (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2008). However, this finding may 
merely reflect mean reversion. These academies replaced some of England’s most poorly 
performing schools and had greater scope for improvement than the average school. A more 
rigorous early analysis is provided by Machin and Wilson (2009) who compare each 
academy to a closest matched non-academy twin and also to other secondary schools in the 
                                                 
9
 GM schools are the predecessors to today’s foundation schools. 
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same local authority. They report positive academy effects on GCSE performance, however, 
their estimates are not statistically significant at standard levels. 
A series of papers estimate difference-in-differences models using a treatment group of 
approximately 100 sponsored academies which opened between 2001/02 and 2008/09. The 
control group consists of a further 100 sponsored academies which re-opened in later school-
years. Using school level data, Machin and Vernoit (2011) find that average GCSE 
attainment and prior (KS2) attainment of the entry-year intake both increase following an 
academy takeover. However, these effects take time to materialise. The authors also present 
evidence that the KS2 attainment of neighbouring schools’ entry-year intake decreases, 
although schools neighbouring the best performing sponsored academies also experience an 
improvement in their average GCSE performance. 
The estimated GCSE attainment effect for sponsored academies could be biased from pupils 
non-randomly switching into or away from academies in response to sponsored academy 
takeovers. Indeed, the increase in the prior attainment of the entry-year intake suggests this is 
a valid concern. Using the same sample of schools, but with pupil level data, (Eyles, Hupkau, 
et al. 2016b), account for this potential source of bias by instrumenting attendance at an 
academy with attendance at the academy’s predecessor school before the takeover.10 The 
authors report that the GCSE point score of pupils who attend an academy for one school-
year is 0.04σ higher on average; while for those attending an academy for four school-years 
the average effect is 0.24σ.11 Only seven per-cent of pupils in the sample attend university, 
however, each school-year spent in a sponsored academy increases the likelihood of 
attendance by 0.7 percentage points.  
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 For similar analysis see Eyles, Hupkau, et al. (2016a). 
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 Eyles and Machin (2015) suggest that the improvement in GCSE performance is only experienced by 
sponsored academies which takeover former community schools. 
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The authors provide a brief insight into the potential mechanisms behind these attainment 
effects. Sponsored academies are much more likely to undergo a leadership change than 
control group schools. Academies also add extra pupils and teachers, including unqualified 
teachers (one of their new freedoms). The teacher-pupil ratio slightly increases. 
There are also improvements in the average prior KS2 attainment of the entry-year intake for 
newer secondary sponsored academies (takeovers after the Academies Act 2010); the 
magnitude of the effect is comparable to that for older academies (Eyles et al. 2015). The 
same paper finds no evidence of a change in the prior attainment of the entry-year intake of 
secondary converter academies. 
A National Audit Office (2010) evaluation suggests that sponsored academies improve other 
student outcomes. Sponsored academies are more effective at reducing the percentage of 
school days lost to absence than comparable maintained schools. Additionally, they are more 
effective than similar non-academies at reducing the number of their pupils not in education 
employment or training (NEET) after age 16. 
A fundamental challenge with evaluating sponsored academies is disentangling the effects of 
increased school autonomy, changes in school leadership and heavily refurbished or newly 
built school buildings. It is not clear how these factors interact to produce a “sponsored 
academy effect”. By comparison converter academies generally experience an increase in the 
first of these factors, but no change in the latter two. 
To date, there are two evaluations of converter primary academies. Worth (2015) uses 
propensity score matching to compare KS2 performance in the 2014/15 school-year between 
primary converter academies and matched non-academies. The analysis does not uncover any 
statistically significant academy status effect on KS2 performance for the average pupil or 
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several sub-groups of pupils. Since this study is cross-sectional, the author is unable to 
control for any time invariant differences between academies and non-academies. 
Eyles, Machin, et al. (2016) applies the methodology of Eyles, Hupkau, et al. (2016b) to an 
analysis of primary converters. The authors find no effect of voluntary academy conversion 
on KS2 attainment. The treatment group consists of primary schools that converted to 
academies in 2010/11 and 2011/12, whilst the control group consists of schools that 
converted in 2014/15 and 2015/16 (the study period ends in 2013/14). However, the criteria 
schools had to satisfy to become converter academies significantly weakened in April 2011. 
Appendix Table 1 shows that in the pre-treatment period, primary schools converting in 
2010-2012 performed better and had more advantaged pupils than primary schools that 
become academies from 2013 onwards. I argue that there may also be unobservable 
differences between pre- and post-2012 primary converter academies as a consequence of the 
change in approval criteria. In this scenario, enrolment in the predecessor school is not a 
validly excluded instrument for enrolment in the converter academy. 
An aspect of the academy programme yet to be fully analysed is academy chains. Half of all 
academies are a constituent of one of nearly 300 chains: academies linked together through a 
common sponsor and/or as a single legal entity (typically, a multi-academy trust). The 
development of chains has been encouraged to mitigate the risks associated with increased 
autonomy, and to facilitate the sharing of best practice. Focusing on long-established chains, 
Hutchings et al. (2014) offers a descriptive analysis of the effectiveness of chains in the 
secondary sector.
12
 The report reveals persistent variation between and within chains in their 
ability to improve disadvantaged pupils’ attainment. Other evidence indicates that sponsored 
academies in chains perform marginally better than standalone sponsored academies. 
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I use extracts from the Department for Education’s National Pupil Database (NPD), a 
collection of linked administrative datasets providing detailed information on England’s state 
schools and their pupils. The Pupil Level School Census (PLSC) links pupils to the school 
they attend at a given point in time. It contains rich demographic information such as gender, 
ethnicity, first language, as well as month and year of birth. Socioeconomic circumstances are 
captured by proxy variables including free school meals (FSM) eligibility history. Other 
relevant circumstances such as special educational needs (SEN) status are recorded. 
PLSC records include an anonymised matching reference number common to attainment 
datasets. As such, pupils can be matched to their KS1 and KS2 attainment records with 
minimal mismatching risk. I also use data from the School Level Database (SLD) to facilitate 
between school comparisons of aggregate pupil demographics and attainment. 
Public primary schools are statutorily required to assess their pupils’ attainment using 
national curriculum (NC) assessments. This includes externally set and marked tests and 
externally moderated teacher based assessments. Primary schools must register their pupils 
for these assessments at the end of key stages 1 and 2 (school years 2 and 6). 
The KS2 assessments feature mathematics and reading tests, as well as a combined spelling, 
punctuation and grammar test (since 2012/13). Separately, year 6 pupils undergo teacher 
assessments in English, mathematics and science. Since 2005, pupils receive a teacher 




Primary NC assessments were graded using a five-point scale (levels 1 to 5) until 2012 when, 
with the intention of challenging high performing pupils, the government introduced level 6. 
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 Pupils previously also sat KS2 writing and science tests, discontinued in 2012 and 2009 respectively. Before 
2005, KS1 attainment was assessed using formal testing. 
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A pupil achieves level 6 at KS2 in a particular subject if they pass a supplementary test. 
Consequentially, the grading and difficulty of the level 1 to 5 KS2 tests did not systematically 
change in 2012. Pupils are expected to be working at level 2 at the end of KS1. Pupils should 
make two levels worth of progress throughout KS2, therefore, year 6 pupils are expected to 
attain level 4. 
I assess the effects of academy conversion on pupil attainment in reading and maths 
separately, since academies may on average place greater emphasis on either subject than 
non-academies following the national curriculum. Attainment is measured using point scores; 
one NC level corresponds to six points. Table 3 acts as a conversion table between NC levels 
and point scores. Point scores convey slightly more information than NC levels for two 
reasons. Firstly, for the purpose of KS1 teacher assessments level 2 is broken down into 
sublevels 2a, 2b and 2c; each corresponding to a different point score. Secondly, pupils who 
are working below level 1 are not awarded a level, but they are given a point score. Use of 
point scores means a more complete sample of students can be used.  
This paper uses a data extract covering school-years 2007/08 to 2014/15. 2014/15 is the most 
recent school-year for which data is currently available, and is also the last school-year in 
which NC levels are used to assess pupils.
14
 I use data on every year 2 and year 6 pupil in 
each of these school-years to determine how academy status may affect pupil attainment. 
Separately, I use data on every reception pupil (the entry-year) to explore whether academy 
status affects the composition of the entry-year intake. Primary schools that do not cover 
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 Significant NC assessment reform introduced in the 2015/16 school year replaced NC levels with “scale 
scores”. Any future long term evaluation of primary academy conversions would be unable to measure pupil 
attainment using NC levels or point scores. The only pupil attainment metric consistently available either side of 
the 2015/16 school year will be raw test scores. 
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reception and key stages 1 and 2 in their entirety or schools that cater to specialist educational 




The causal effects of conversion to academy status are estimated using difference-in-
differences (DiD) models. The baseline estimating equation is  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡#(1)  
where 𝑖, 𝑠 and 𝑡 are pupil, school and school-year identifiers respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 refers 
generically to an attainment measure. 𝛼𝑠 is a school fixed effect and 𝛼𝑡 is a school-year 
(time) effect. Binary variable 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 equals 1 if school 𝑠 is a primary converter academy 
in school-year 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. Conversion is an “absorbing” state since no academies 
revert back to maintained school status. The parameter of interest is 𝛽1 representing the 
estimated average causal effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). This is the estimated 
average change in attainment in converter academies caused by conversion to academy 
status. 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of time-varying control variables. Under the parallel trends assumption 
the error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, is orthogonal to 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡. I assume this term has a school/school-year 
specific component that is likely to exhibit serial correlation over time. Therefore, I estimate 
robust standard errors clustered at the school level, as advocated by Bertrand et al. (2004). 
There are approximately 1,300 clusters which exceeds the standard minimum number of 
clusters required to estimate robust clustered standard errors (Cameron and Miller 2015). 
When outcome 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a measure of KS2 attainment, a value-added model can be estimated 
using prior KS1 attainment. This model is motivated by the lack of observed historical school 
and parental inputs. These important unobserved inputs are proxied using prior attainment. I 
include prior KS1 attainment in vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡, which assumes the effects of historical inputs 
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 In other words, lower and middles schools are excluded from the analysis. 
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experience a common rate of geometric decay. The alternative case where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is equal to the 
difference of current and prior attainment assumes prior inputs are as relevant as current 
inputs.  
The value-added model does not account for contemporaneous changes in parental inputs. 
Parents may interpret a school’s decision to become a converter academy as a positive or 
negative signal of the school’s quality, and may adjust their parental inputs accordingly. 
Therefore, the estimated treatment effects are net of the average parental response to their 
child’s school becoming an academy. Value-added models are thoroughly critiqued in Todd 
and Wolpin (2003), which also discusses the unavoidable restrictions that such models place 
on the underlying education production function. 
26 per-cent of primary schools participated in a boycott of KS2 assessments tests in May 
2010. Since participation in the boycott was non-random and widespread, the 2009/10 
school-year is dropped from the panel for KS2 attainment analysis. This means the pre-
treatment period spans four schools-years (two either side of the dropped year). 
I extend equation 1 in several ways to accommodate different forms of treatment effect 
heterogeneity. Equation 1 imposes a constant average treatment effect for every school-year 
following academy conversion. It is unlikely that academies fully realise and exploit the 
implications of their enhanced independence straight after conversion. Instead there may be 
an adjustment period during which academies gradually implement changes that would not 
have been possible as a maintained school. It is appropriate to adopt a specification that 
allows the treatment effect to vary according to the length of time elapsed since conversion 
occurred. A more flexible variant of equation (1) is 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑟 𝜏𝑡𝑠
𝜏=2
𝜏=−4
+ 𝛾′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡#(2)  
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where 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑟 − 4𝑡𝑠 to 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑟 2𝑡𝑠 are binary variables equal to 1 if school-year 𝑡 
corresponds to between four school-years before and two school-years after school 𝑠 
becomes an academy. This is sometimes referred to as the leads and lags DiD estimator and 
attributed to Autor (2003). If the control and treated groups have differential trends in the 
absence of treatment, then the pre-treatment beta estimates (?̂?−4, … , ?̂?−1) will be significantly 
different from zero. Estimates that are not significantly different from zero lend support in 
favour of the identifying assumption. 
In addition, equation (1) does not allow the treatment effect to vary between academies with 
different predecessor school types, despite academies experiencing varying degrees of 
autonomy before conversion. As schools experience differential increases in autonomy 
following conversion to academy status, there is an element of treatment intensity which 
could be captured. I interact a binary variable equal to 1 if an academy was previously a 
community or voluntary-controlled school (𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑠) and 0 otherwise, with 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡. In 
equation (3), 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is the average treatment effect for academies which were previously 
community or voluntary-controlled schools, whereas 𝛽1 is the average treatment effect for 
academies whose predecessor school was another maintained school type. 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑠) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡#(3)  
Certain sub-groups of the pupil population may be affected differently by academy 
conversion than the average pupil. The autonomy accompanying academy status may allow 
academies to redirect their attention and resources towards or away from certain pupil groups. 
Two important sub-groups are pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and SEN pupils. I use 
FSM eligibility to indicate disadvantage. I further estimate equations 4 and 5. 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑆𝑀𝑖) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡#(4)  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑖) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡#(5)  
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FSM eligibility and SEN status are recorded in vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡. In equation 4, 𝛽1 is the ATT for 
pupils who are illegible for FSM, while 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is the ATT for FSM pupils. In equation 5, 
the ATT for SEN pupils is 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 and 𝛽1 is the ATT for non-SEN pupils. Equations 1 to 5 
are estimated using pupil level data. 
For the entry-year intake analysis, the baseline estimating equation is 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡#(6)  
where 𝑦𝑠𝑡 refers to the entry-year cohort average of a certain pupil characteristic for school 𝑠 
in school-year 𝑡. The interpretation of the equation’s remaining components is the same as in 
the preceding equations. 𝛽1 is the ATT estimate which is the estimated average change in the 
cohort average of a certain attribute of the entry-year intake experienced by schools when 
they become academies. 
The 𝛽 estimates in equations 1 to 6 provide unbiased treatment effect estimates if the parallel 
trend assumption holds conditional on the control variable vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡. The school fixed effect 
controls for differences in time invariant characteristics between treatment and control 
schools. It remains a possibility that schools become academies on the basis of unobserved 
trends. I depend on the parallel trends assumption to dismiss this remaining identification 
threat. 
To maximise the likelihood that the outcomes of the treatment and control groups share a 
common time trend in the absence of treatment, the two groups should be as similar as 
possible in all dimensions, observed and unobserved, other than treatment status. Whilst the 
application procedure and criteria for approval for academy conversion changed during the 
2010/11 school-year, it has not significantly changed since. As such, schools that later 
become academies should be quite similar to already opened academies. 
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The treatment group is defined as all schools that become converter academies in the school-
years 2012/13 to 2014/15. The control group is schools that become converter academies 
during the 2015/16 school-year. The treatment group includes schools that experience one to 
three school-years of academy status. The implication of this research design for the main 
outcome of interest, value-added at KS2, is that I observe cohorts who spend between one 
and three school-years of KS2 (which spans four school-years) at an academy. The minimum 
observed pre-treatment period is four school-years. 
Table 4 compares average pupil characteristics and attainment (at school level) over the 
period 2007/08 to 2011/12 (the pre-treatment period) for the control and treatment groups. 
Column 3 tests the equality of means between the two groups. The means are not 
significantly different at conventional levels of significance, providing good evidence that the 
groups are alike in terms of observable factors. The table also shows the mean of each 
variable for treatment group academies split by year of conversion. This illustrates that the 
composition of the treatment group does not systematically vary by year of conversion. 
Appendix Table 2 tests whether the groups share a common time trend in the pre-treatment 
period. Maths and reading KS2 attainment are regressed on a school fixed effect, either a 
linear time trend or a set of time effects and an interaction between the time trend/effects and 
a treatment group indicator. The null hypothesis – the interactions between the treatment 
group indicator and time effects for pre-treatment periods are jointly equal to zero – cannot 
be rejected at significance levels below 66 per-cent. 
In Appendix Table 1, I compare the means of the same variables over the pre-treatment 
period for various school types. This shows that primary schools which became converter 
academies during the first two school-years of the converter academy programme had better 
KS2 results and more advantaged pupils than schools that later became academies. These 
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schools are not included in the treatment group because of these significant differences in 
pre-treatment characteristics. 
6 Results 
6.1 KS2 attainment 
Table 5 contains the estimates from difference-in-differences (DiD) models with a single 
post-treatment effect. In columns 1 to 3, the outcome is a pupil’s KS2 maths test point score. 
KS2 reading test point score is the outcome variable for columns 4 to 6. Columns 1 and 4 
feature estimates from a DiD model without any control variables. I add control variables in 
columns 2 and 5, and then add prior attainment in each subject in columns 3 and 6 to create a 
value-added model. The academy coefficient estimate (found in the first row) corresponds to 
the estimated effect of academy conversion. The estimates are relatively consistent as control 
variables and then KS1 attainment are added to the model, ranging between -0.01 to 0.06 
points (recall that 6 points is equivalent to 1 NC level). None of the estimates are statistically 
different from zero at the ten per-cent significance level. This is in contrast to the control 
variable coefficients which are uniformly estimated with high precision, and are statistically 
different from zero.  These estimates do not provide evidence of an academy status effect on 
KS2 attainment. This finding is not sensitive to the measure of KS2 attainment. Appendix 
Table 3 shows there is no academy status effect when the dependent variable is the 
standardised raw test score or a binary variable indicating if the expected NC level (level 4) is 
achieved. In the following tables, I present estimates from the preferred specification 
(columns 3 and 6) only; estimates are not sensitive to specification choice.
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Figure 1 plots estimates from models with pre- and post-treatment effects. I estimate the 
effect of being in the treatment group in the years leading up to and following treatment. This 
allows the treatment effect to vary by length of exposure, and can also be used to assess the 
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validity of the common trends assumption. There should be no “effect” from being in the 
treatment group prior to treatment. If an “effect” is consistently found prior to treatment, then 
this raises concerns about the research design. In Figure 1, the coefficient estimate for school-
year 0 corresponds to the estimated academy status effect during the conversion year. 
Coefficient estimates for school-years less than 0 correspond to pre-treatment effect 
estimates. Figure 1a plots the estimated treatment effects on KS2 maths point score, while the 
effect on KS2 reading point score is depicted in Figure 1b. The findings from Figure 1 are 
consistent with those from Table 5; no statistically significant treatment effect is found for 
attainment in either subject in any treated school-year conditional on the control variables and 
prior attainment. Aside from one pre-treatment effect estimate at the fringes of statistical and 
economic significance, there is no evidence of differential trends between the control and 
treatment groups prior to treatment. This is indicative of the common trends assumption 
holding. 
It is plausible that academy conversion effects on KS2 attainment exist for sub-populations of 
pupils and schools, in spite of the seeming lack of an effect for the average school or pupil. 
Table 6 presents estimates from three DiD models which accommodate heterogeneous 
treatment effects for special educational need (SEN) pupils, disadvantaged pupils, and 
academies which were relatively autonomous before conversion. 
Panel A contains estimates from a model accommodating heterogeneous effects by SEN 
status. Column 1 indicates that neither SEN nor non-SEN pupils’ KS2 maths point scores are 
affected by academy conversion. However, it does appear that SEN and non-SEN pupils’ 
KS2 reading point scores are affected differently by academy conversion. Non-SEN pupils 
experience a 0.14 point average reduction in their reading point score. This is equivalent to 1 
in 43 pupils achieving one less NC level in reading as a result of their school becoming an 
academy. This effect is statistically significant as is the 0.55 point increase in the reading 
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point score of SEN pupils. This corresponds to 1 in 10 SEN pupils gaining one extra NC level 
in reading. 
Estimates from models allowing the academy conversion effect to vary by free school meal 
(FSM) eligibility are presented in Panel B. This is the best available indicator of whether the 
pupil’s background is disadvantaged.  Column 1 indicates there is no evidence that KS2 
maths attainment is affected by academy conversion irrespective of FSM eligibility. When 
considering reading attainment, there is no apparent academy conversion effect on FSM 
ineligible pupils; although FSM eligible pupils experience a 0.28 point gain in their reading 
point scores on average. This translates into 1 in 21 FSM eligible pupils achieving one NC 
level higher in their KS2 reading assessment. 
Panel C investigates school level heterogeneity, the reported model allows the academy 
conversion effect to vary between former community and voluntary-controlled schools, 
which had the least autonomy before becoming an academy, and voluntary-aided and 
foundation schools which were relatively more autonomous. The academy conversion effect 
on KS2 maths attainment is insignificantly different from zero regardless of the school’s 
previous structure. Pupils in former voluntary-controlled and community school academies 
gain 0.046 points in KS2 reading on average, whilst pupils from other formerly maintained 
schools lose 0.11 points on average.  These effects are statistically significant at the 10% 
level. However, they are trivial, for example the gain experienced in former voluntary-
controlled and community schools is comparable to 1 in 130 pupils gaining one additional 
reading NC level. 
6.2 KS1 attainment 
Table 7 presents estimates of the effect of academy conversion on KS1 maths attainment (see 
the first two columns) and KS1 reading attainment (see the last two columns). Since KS1 is 
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the first formal assessment of pupils there is no opportunity to implement a value-added 
model. This increases the scope for bias from unobserved confounders relative to the KS2 
value-added models. Because of this and the more subjective nature of teacher assessments, 
less weight should be placed on this second set of estimates. The estimates of the academy 
coefficient are stable following the inclusion of control variables, but are insignificantly 
different from zero both statistically and economically; whereas every control variable 
coefficient is precisely estimated at the one per-cent level. No evidence is found of an 
academy conversion effect on KS1 attainment. This finding is consistent with an unreported 
dynamic DiD model, in which pre- and post-treatment effect estimates are insignificantly 
different from zero. 
Again, it is possible that the zero average treatment effect on KS1 attainment is masking non-
zero treatment effects for school and pupil sub-populations. In an unreported exercise, I 
investigate heterogeneous treatment effects at the pupil level (by SEN status and FSM 
eligibility) and at the school level (by predecessor school type). 
I find evidence of a positive effect on KS1 reading point score for SEN pupils of 0.19 points, 
and a negative effect on the same outcome for non-SEN pupils of 0.08 points. There is no 
apparent effect on KS1 reading for FSM ineligible pupils, but there is a small positive effect 
for FSM eligible pupils. I also find evidence of a positive effect on KS1 reading for schools 
that were the least autonomous before conversion, and a negative effect for the most 
autonomous schools before conversions. The nature of heterogeneous effect estimates for the 
KS1 reading analysis mirrors the KS2 reading analysis closely, however, the magnitude of 
the estimates are much smaller. In terms of KS1 maths heterogeneous effects, I find evidence 
of trivial positive effects for SEN pupils and FSM eligible pupils. 
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6.3 Entry-year intake 
Finally, I explore whether the composition of schools’ entry-year intake changes following 
academy conversion. Table 8 reports the findings from a rudimentary DiD model estimated 
on school level data where the outcome variables are the percentage of entry-year cohort: 
eligible for FSM; with SEN; whose first language is English, and who are white. The 
academy coefficients in columns 1 to 3 are insignificantly different from zero suggesting the 
composition of the entry-year intake for schools is not affected by becoming an academy in 
three of the four characteristics investigated. However, column 4’s estimate suggests that 
academies experience a 0.6 percentage point decline in the proportion of their entry-year 
intake that is white. 81 per-cent of entry-year pupils are white in the sample. It is unusual that 
the composition of the new intake would change in this dimension only. Given that the size 
of the effect is modest at best, I opt to place little emphasis on this finding.  
Since very few pupils switch primary schools outside of the entry-year, the lack of evidence 
of a systematic change in the composition of the entry-year cohort suggests it is unlikely the 
composition of other year groups is systematically affected by academy conversion. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper attempts to quantify the causal effect of the voluntary conversion of English state 
primary schools into academies on pupil attainment, and the composition of the entry-year 
intake. To this end, the staggered nature of academy conversions across schools and the 
availability of a rich administrative dataset are exploited in a battery of difference-in-
differences models. 
Estimates from these models consistently find no evidence of an academy conversion effect 
on KS2 maths and reading test point scores for the average pupil. Similarly, heterogeneous 
effects models do not find any effect on pupil and school sub-groups, with the exception of 
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SEN pupils. One in ten SEN pupils achieve one NC level higher in KS2 reading subsequent 
to academy conversion. KS1 teacher assessments and the composition of the entry-year 
intake are seemingly unaffected by academy conversion. 
Although these results are consistent with prior research into primary converter academies, 
studies of secondary sponsored academies have found academy status effects on attainment. 
A number of reasons may explain this discrepancy. Firstly, converter academy pupils tend to 
be more advantaged and academically meritorious than their sponsored academy peers. If the 
marginal effect of school inputs is diminishing, and academy status improves school inputs 
comparably in converter and sponsored academies, then academy status will be more 
effective in sponsored academies were pupils’ attainment is at a lower base level. 
However, academy status means different things for sponsored and converter academies. 
First-generation sponsored academies often enjoyed new or extensively refurbished facilities, 
which is likely to positively affect pupil attainment. Additionally, these academies were 
highly susceptible to leadership changes following conversion (Eyles and Machin 2015). 
Converter academies are not more likely to undergo leadership changes following their 
conversions (Eyles, Machin, et al. 2016).  Leadership changes may partially explain the 
difference in the effectiveness of converter and sponsored academy conversions. Suppose 
underperforming schools are unattractive to effective head-teachers. If sponsored academy 
status increases the attractiveness of an underperforming school to effective head-teachers, 
then sponsored academies may improve pupil attainment through attracting a higher calibre 
of head-teacher. Converter academies might already be attractive to quality school leaders 
due to their record of good performance. These schools may not attract better leaders 
following conversions, and, therefore, might not experience attainment improvements.
17
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 If this hypothesis is true, then the effectiveness of sponsored academy status should diminish as the sponsored 
academy sector expands. 
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The difference in estimated academy status effects may be explained by differences in the 
stages of schooling. Primary schools are usually smaller than secondary schools, implement 
different teaching methods, and have different educational goals. The freedom of academies 
to set their own curriculum may be more consequential for attainment in secondary schools, 
since secondary pupils are formally assessed in a wider range of subjects (partially 
determined by the school); whereas, primary school pupils are predominately assessed in 
numeracy and literacy. Secondly, if the financial benefit from becoming an academy results 
in increased availability of effective school resources, then academy status may be more 
effective at secondary level, as these schools face greater per-pupil costs than primary 
schools. 
Irrespective of the mechanisms driving the differences between the effectiveness of 
sponsored and converter academy status, the lack of evidence of an improvement in 
attainment of primary converter academies suggests that increasing school autonomy is not a 
panacea in and of itself. This is an important finding given the considerable cost of the 
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Figure 1a: Pre and post-treatment effect estimates for KS2 maths point score (point 
estimates and 95% confidence interval) 
  
Figure 1b: Pre and post-treatment effect estimates for KS2 reading point score (point 
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 Table 1: The composition of English public primary schools at the start of the school-year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
            
Converter academy 0 0 0 0 0 6 265 647 1,069 1,462 1,859 
Sponsored academy  0 0 0 0 0 0 5 115 391 685 898 
Free school 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 34 37 92 117 
Community school 10,272 10,145 10,016 9,893 9,803 9,727 9,491 9,111 8,624 8,166 7,842 
Foundation school 902 903 909 911 913 911 863 819 768 734 698 
Voluntary aided school 3,780 3,769 3,757 3,747 3,738 3,730 3,684 3,606 3,479 3,326 3,148 
Voluntary controlled school 2,481 2,481 2,468 2,465 2,459 2,455 2,427 2,384 2,313 2,234 2,155 
            
Grand Total 17,435 17,298 17,150 17,016 16,913 16,829 16,737 16,716 16,681 16,699 16,717 
Notes: each column shows the number of schools of each type open on September 1
st
 of that year. Source: author’s analysis of EduBase data.
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Table 2: Primary converter academy schools by school-year of conversion to academy 
status and predecessor school type 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 Total 
        
Community school 77 226 252 232 166 203 1,156 
Voluntary controlled school 7 41 43 47 50 58 246 
Voluntary aided school 5 82 110 125 128 93 543 
Foundation school 31 55 42 18 21 20 187 
Multiple or no predecessor school 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 
        
Total 122 404 447 422 365 376 2,136 
Notes: school-year is defined as 1
st
 August to 31
st
 July the following calendar year. Source: author’s analysis of 




Table 3: National curriculum level to point score conversion table 
 
Notes: NC level 6 was introduced in 
2011/12. Level 2 with no sub-level is 
equivalent to level 2b. 
 














Table 4: Test of mean equality between treatment and control groups in averaged attainment and pupil characteristics 
 













        
KS2 math points 27.66 27.86 -0.20
*
  27.88 27.82 27.90 
   (0.11)     
KS2 reading points 28.66 28.81 -0.15  28.78 28.81 28.85 
   (0.11)     
Prior KS1 math points 15.88 15.93 -0.05  15.85 15.91 16.06 
   (0.07)     
Prior KS1 reading points 15.65 15.69 -0.04  15.58 15.67 15.85 
   (0.09)     
Headcount 262.45 268.68 -6.23  293.62 264.87 241.86 
   (9.71)     
% white British 80.80 82.04 -1.24  79.54 82.84 84.22 
   (1.51)     
% English speakers 89.32 90.21 -0.88  88.60 90.25 92.17 
   (1.21)     
% FSM eligible 14.51 14.91 -0.40  16.06 14.89 13.47 
   (0.87)     
        
Observations 268 1,056   384 367 305 
Notes: variables are school level averages between 2007/08 and 2011/12. 
*** 
denotes significance at 1% level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*





Table 5: KS2 maths and reading point score DiD models with common treatment effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
Academy 0.0579 0.0156 0.0349 0.0258 -0.0138 0.0039 










  (0.0162) (0.0129)  (0.0145) (0.0125) 









  (0.0548) (0.0368)  (0.0590) (0.0327) 



















  (0.0327) (0.0234)  (0.0392) (0.0296) 









  (0.0283) (0.0206)  (0.0281) (0.0220) 
KS1 math points   0.8253
***
    
   (0.0037)    
KS1 reading points      0.5700
***
 














 (0.0294) (0.0581) (0.0723) (0.0292) (0.0545) (0.0625) 
School fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
No. of academies 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 
No. of future academies 269 269 269 269 269 269 
Observations 350,005 347,162 333,974 350,189 347,348 331,185 
Adj. R-Square 0.083 0.275 0.543 0.069 0.278 0.459 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. 
*** 
denotes significance at 1% level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*




Table 6: KS2 maths and reading point score DiD models with heterogonous treatment 
effects 
 (1) (2) 
 KS2 maths points KS2 reading points 
   




 (0.0532) (0.0447) 
Academy x SEN 0.0347 0.6867
***
 






 (0.0257) (0.0325) 
   
Adj. R-Square 0.543 0.459 
   
Panel B: Heterogeneity by FSM eligibility   
Academy 0.0416 -0.0425 
 (0.0537) (0.0455) 









 (0.0239) (0.0263) 
   
Adj. R-Square 0.543 0.459 
   




 (0.0731) (0.0601) 
Academy x community or voluntary-





   
Adj. R-Square 0.543 0.459 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Value-added model Yes Yes 
School fixed effects  Yes Yes 
School year effects  Yes Yes 
   
No. of academies 1,062 1,062 
No. of future academies 269 269 
Observations 333,974 331,185 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. 
*** 
denotes significance at 1% 
level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*
 at 10% level. 
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Table 7: Mid primary school (KS1) maths and reading point score DiD models with common 
treatment effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Academy 0.0279 -0.0120 0.0070 -0.0402 






  (0.0109)  (0.0117) 





  (0.0335)  (0.0422) 











  (0.0263)  (0.0297) 















 (0.0236) (0.0384) (0.0255) (0.0425) 
School fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of academies 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 
No. of future academies 292 292 292 292 
Observations 436,464 432,669 436,453 432,659 
Adj. R-Square 0.071 0.258 0.077 0.295 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. 
*** 
denotes significance at 1% 
level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*
 at 10% level.  
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Table 8: Entry-year intake composition DiD model with school-level data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FSM Eligible SEN English is first 
language 
White ethnicity 
     
Academy -0.0056 -0.0031 -0.0017 -0.0059
**
 










 (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0032) (0.0020) 
School fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of academies 1,137 1,137 847 961 
No. of future academies 288 288 214 245 
Observations 11,400 11,400 8,488 9,648 
Adj. R-Square 0.715 0.333 0.750 0.898 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. 
*** 
denotes significance at 
1% level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*
 at 10% level.
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KS2 maths points 28.54 27.87 27.66 25.95 27.53 28.06 28.19 27.76 27.68 
KS2 reading points 29.36 28.81 28.66 26.74 28.35 29.17 29.24 28.68 28.60 
Prior KS1 maths 
points 
16.24 15.93 15.88 14.99 15.68 16.21 16.13 16.01 15.83 
Prior KS1 reading 
points 
16.05 15.69 15.65 14.47 15.37 16.05 16.02 15.78 15.58 
Headcount 306.43 268.95 261.87 276.77 275.40 168.00 217.87 281.70 252.12 
% white British 81.56 82.04 80.81 73.77 76.38 89.92 76.79 80.15 78.61 
% English 
speakers 
90.39 90.22 89.32 83.34 85.18 95.65 87.72 88.66 87.46 
% FSM eligible 11.78 14.89 14.54 25.90 18.11 9.58 13.19 12.94 16.07 
          
Observations 447 1,062 269 910 6,660 1,615 2,706 215 13,884 




Appendix Table 2: Test for differential time trend in KS2 attainment between groups 
 (1) (2) 
 KS2 maths points KS2 reading points 
   




























 (0.1290) (0.1099) 
2013/14 -0.1392 -0.0780 
 (0.1207) (0.0930) 
Treatment x 2007/08 -0.1767 -0.1021 
 (0.1587) (0.1428) 
Treatment x 2008/09 -0.0680 0.0159 
 (0.1516) (0.1417) 
Treatment x 2010/11 -0.0118 0.0172 
 (0.1394) (0.1288) 
Treatment x 2011/12 0.0291 -0.0456 
 (0.1407) (0.1231) 
Treatment x 2012/13 -0.0582 -0.1055 
 (0.1419) (0.1212) 
Treatment x 2013/14 0.0977 0.1505 






 (0.0371) (0.0320) 
F test 0.598 0.331 
p-value 0.664 0.857 
Adj. R-Square 0.548 0.491 
   






 (0.0181) (0.0173) 
School year x Treatment 0.0255 0.0132 






 (0.0897) (0.0817) 
Adj. R-Square  0.548 0.491 
   
School fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,268 9,268 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. The F-test null hypothesis is 
that the treatment/time effect interactions up to 2011/12 are jointly insignificant. 
*** 
denotes 
significance at 1% level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*
 at 10% level.
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Appendix Table 3: Common treatment effect DiD models with alternative KS2 attainment 
measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 KS2 maths test 







Academy 0.0119 0.0025 0.0008 0.0017 










 (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0057) (0.0035) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Value-added model Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of academies 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 
No. of future academies 269 269 269 269 
Observations 326,835 324,369 324,653 319,049 
Adj. R-Square 0.472 0.435 0.208 0.133 
Notes: standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. Outcome variables in columns 1 and 
2 are standardized test marks with zero mean and unit standard deviation. Dependent variable in 
columns 3 and 4 are equal to one if the pupil achieves NC level 4 in maths or reading and zero 
otherwise.
*** 
denotes significance at 1% level, 
** 
at 5% level, 
*
 at 10% level. 
